Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop: The Government Procurement Channel

نویسندگان

چکیده

We show that banks' lending exposure to firms with government procurement contracts can amplify the diabolic loop between sovereigns and banks. Using fiscal austerity measures implemented during 2010-2011 European sovereign debt crisis as a shock procurement, we find banks higher these reduced significantly more than lower exposure, controlling for firm-specific credit demand. The reduction in supply is economically important effect of holdings, affected both without contracts. Firms relationships experienced sales growth, assets employment investment. This decrease real economic activity likely reduce tax revenue, further amplifying loop.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1556-5068']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873264