“Sorry, We're Closed” Bank Branch Closures, Loan Pricing, and Information Asymmetries*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank corporate loan pricing following the subprime crisis
The massive losses that banks incurred with the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market have raised concerns about their ability to continue lending to corporations. We investigate these concerns. We find that firms paid higher loan spreads during the subprime crisis. Importantly, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred larger losses. These resu...
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I study a simple market microstructure model in a competitive setting where rational risk neutral investors anticipate becoming liquidity sellers (they are forced to sell with a certain probability) and paying transaction costs (adverse selection costs as well as fixed and/or proportional cost) at some future date. To buy stocks in the IPO they must be compensated for expected future trading lo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Finance
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1572-3097,1573-692X
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaa036