Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
W econsider two-personundiscoun tedrepeatedgameswithlac k ofinformation one sideandstateindependentsignalling andprovetheexistence ofa \join tplan"uniform equilibrium.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.004