Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions
In numerous economic scenarios, contracting parties may not have a clear picture of all the relevant aspects. A contracting party may be unaware of what she and/or others are entitled to determine. Therefore, she may reject a contract that is too good to be true. Further, a contracting party may actively exert cognitive effort before signing a contract, so as to avoid being trapped into the con...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g4030508