Soft Law, Authoritative Advice and Non-binding Agreements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
non-legal sanctions in soft law
based on the current approach, to ascertain and enforce the sanctions in law is one of the exclusive functions of governments. but the deeper examination reveals that many transactors prefer non-legal sanctions. at first glance, this self-enforcement mechanism seems to be contrary to legal fundamentals. therefore, these sanctions are contested in law. this article is an attempt to consider a ne...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0143-6503,1464-3820
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqz009