Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium

Abstract In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into “natural” that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For resulting socio-legal extend concepts and its equilibria Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on more general version equilibrium due Shafer Sonnenschein (J Math 2(3):345–348, 1975) also generalizes dc-mechanism Koray Yildiz Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). second part apply illustrate these new an application in narrow welfarist framework two person cooperative bargaining. There provide based Nash’s demand Nash bargaining solution equilibrium.