Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets

نویسندگان
چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of Network Economics

سال: 2006

ISSN: 1446-9022,2194-5993

DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1091