Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining¤
The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bargaining behavior in recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a clear picture of responders’ utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in which responders’ can “shrink” an o¤er as well as to accept or reject it. This allows us to observe enough about responders’ preferences to e...
متن کاملSocial Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining*
Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer-specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—...
متن کاملideological and cultural orientations in translation of narrative text: the case of hajji baba of isfahan
در میان عواملی که ممکن است ذهن مترجم را هنگام ترجمه تحت تأثیر قرار دهند، می توان به مقوله انتقال ایدئولوژی از طریق متن یا گفتمان اشاره کرد. هدف از این تحقیق تجزیه و تحلیل جنبه های ایدئولوژیکی و فرهنگی متن مبدأ انگلیسی نوشته جیمز موریه تحت عنوان سرگذشت حاجی بابای اصفهانی ( 1823) و ترجمه فارسی میرزا حبیب اصفهانی(1880) بوده است.
Fairness concerns predict medial frontal negativity amplitude in ultimatum bargaining.
Despite evidence that anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activity is related to social exclusion, rejection and unfairness, evidence that medial frontal negativity (MFN), which has its source in the ACC, reflects these constructs remains unforthcoming. In the present study, subjects participated as recipients in an ultimatum game, while we recorded their electro-encephalogram (EEG). Participants r...
متن کاملFairness in Ultimatum Bargaining with Outside Options: Experimental Evidence
Results of ultimatum bargaining experiments show a persistence of behavior that deviates from Nash equilibrium predictions. In addition to strategic considerations, many have attributed these results to a taste for fairness on the part of subjects. We investigate this concept by introducing an outside option for proposers in the game. We find that the outcome of the experiment varies systematic...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0022-1031
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.03.002