Social Value of Public Information

Social Value of Public Information

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Experiments on the Social Value of Public Information∗

We present the results of laboratory experiments studying the “CNBC Effect”– situations where the social value of public information is negative. Payoffs depend on two factors: being right (i.e. matching an underlying, but unknown state variable) and coordinating with others, which has no social value. In our baseline treatment, individuals privately receive an informative signal. When we add a...

The Social Value of Information with an Endogenous Public Signal

I analyse the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities, in a general model which nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions. I analyse how endogenous public information, which causes an information externality, combines with payoff exte...

SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION BY STEPHEN MORRIS and HYUN

The Value of Public Information in Monopoly∗

The logic of the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) extends to price discrimination. A non-linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information affiliated to the valuation of the buyer.