منابع مشابه
Social Norms in Social Insurance
We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the informati...
متن کاملthe role of type-d personality, social support and self-compassion in prediction of health behaviors in coronary heart disease patients
نظر به اهمیت و تاثیر روزافزون عوامل روانی – اجتماعی در سلامت جسمی و تاثیر عوامل روان شناختی در بروز بیماریهای مختلف از جمله بیماریهای قلبی و عروقی این پژوهش با هدف کلی بررسی ارتباط تیپ شخصیتی d ، حمایت اجتماعی و خود دلسوزی در پیش بینی رفتارهای بهداشتی بیماران کرونر قلبی و تعیین تفاوت بین بیماران کرونر قلبی با و بدون جراحی و افراد سالم در این متغیرها و رفتارهای بهداشتی آنان، انجام گرفت. جامعه آ...
15 صفحه اولManaging Environmental Risk through Insurance
Risk is inherent in all human activities, both personal and professional. While the number and variety of risks have grown and changed dramatically throughout history, the basics remain the same: risk of loss of life, limb, health, livelihood, or property due to predictable events (reduced income upon reaching the mandatory retirement age) or to unpredictable events (loss of life in an earthqua...
متن کاملPolitically sustainable social insurance
Private information underpins a basic social trade-off between incentives and inequality. Normative models of dynamic incentive provision explore the optimal evolution of this trade-off. Many prescribe relentlessly increasing levels of inequality. Indeed, under a variety of standard preference assumptions, an immiseration result obtains: a privileged measure zero set of agents obtain all resour...
متن کاملPolitically Credible Social Insurance
This paper considers political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. JEL codes: C73, D72, D82...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Studies in Regional Science
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0287-6256,1880-6465
DOI: 10.2457/srs.36.71