منابع مشابه
Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws∗
We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. There are complementarities in behaviors so that an agent’s payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner’s, a...
متن کاملClass systems and the enforcement of social norms
We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition. However, the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose. We demonstrat...
متن کاملStrong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms.
This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal coop...
متن کاملSocial Norms and Moral Norms Workshop Social Norms and Moral Norms Workshop Welcome Address
Dear Participant, We are very pleased to welcome you at the GATE research institute. This workshop aims at developing scientific discussions about Social Norms and Moral Norms. The objective is to better understand when people are more, or less, likely to act honestly and follow the moral course of action and norms instead of serving their strict self-interest at the others' expense. We are ext...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement∗
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is suffi ciently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a “one-time enforcer punishment equilibrium,” where any deviation b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2297925