Social learning with private and common values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Learning with Private and Common Values
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result fo...
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We characterize equilibrium in a dynamic investment game with two-dimensional signals, where each firm observes its idiosyncratic cost of investment and a signal correlated with common investment returns. We demonstrate that the one-step property holds and that investment-cost cutoffs for type-1 firms (with the high common-value signal) and type-0 firms (with the low common-value signal) satisf...
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We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival’s signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information—public versus private—and of what firms learn about—common versus private values—affect equilibrium outcomes. Firm output...
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Competitors’ incentives to reveal private information are explored when there are both common and private components to their valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. When agents only observe one signal, they do not have incentives to reveal, because revealing the only signal makes them fully lose their information advantage (suggested by the literature). However, when age...
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We study a dynamic investment game with two-dimensional signals, where each firm observes its continuously distributed idiosyncratic cost of investment and a discrete signal correlated with common investment returns. We demonstrate that the one-step property holds and provide an equilibrium existence/characterization result. “Reversals” are possible, where a large number of firms investing in a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5