Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Manipulation in Voting: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination
In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
متن کاملAltruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior
We consider the problem of costly voting in a game-theoretic framework where agents are altruistic. We show that if, as usual, agentstypes are assumed to be independently and identically distributed, the classical theorem of Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal (1985) on the impossibility of large-scale turnout essentially survives, despite the introduction of altruism. We solve this problem...
متن کاملStrategic Voting and Social Networks: (Doctoral Consortium)
The effects of social networks are pervasive in everyday life, from the subtle effects on mundane, momentto-moment choices, to political revolutions driven through social media. The last few years have seen a rapid growth of interest in this area from researchers within artificial intelligence and multiagent systems communities. Until recently, relatively little attention has been paid on under...
متن کاملStrategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates, whereas voters vote truthfully. In this paper, we extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of the voters. (We also study cases where only candidates or only voters are strategic.) We consider two ...
متن کاملThe Echo Chamber: Strategic Voting and Homophily in Social Networks
We propose a model where voters are embedded in a social network. Each voter observes the ballots of her neighbors in the network, from which she infers the likely outcome of the election. Each voter may then revise her vote strategically, to maximize her expected utility. Our work focuses on plurality voting, where strategic voting is a major concern. We show that in practice, strategization i...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0241-3