Social interaction under truly perfect information

Subgame-perfect Implementation under Information Perturbations*

We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undes...

Subgame Perfect Implementation under Perfect and Almost Perfect Information: An Empirical Test

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good’s value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a s...

Agents with truly perfect recall in alternating-time temporal logic

ATL* With Truly Perfect Recall: Expressivity and Validities

In alternating-time temporal logic ATL, agents with perfect recall assign choices to sequences of states, i.e., to possible finite histories of the game. However, when a nested strategic modality is interpreted, the new strategy does not take into account the previous sequence of events. It is as if agents collect their observations in the nested game again from scratch, thus effectively forget...

Health and Social Media: Perfect Storm of Information

OBJECTIVES The use of Internet in the health domain is becoming a major worldwide trend. Millions of citizens are searching online health information and also publishing content about their health. Patients are engaging with other patients in online communities using different types of social media. The boundaries between mobile health, social media, wearable, games, and big data are becoming b...