Social integration in two-sided matching markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
Article history: Received 20 June 2011 Available online 28 November 2013 JEL classification: C78 D43 L13
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.003