Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity. These two forms of inequity aversion follow different developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion emerging around 4 years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity aversion is assumed to be specific to situations where res...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLoS ONE
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080966