Social Exclusion and Optimal Redistribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Exclusion and Social Norms
Being excluded and ignored has been shown to threaten fundamental human needs and cause pain. Such reflexive reactions to social exclusion have been conceptualized as direct and unmoderated (temporal need threat model, Williams, 2009). Here we propose an extension and argue that reflexive reactions depend on how social exclusion situations are construed. If being excluded is understood as a vio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3979353