منابع مشابه
Social Context Congestion Games
The widespread of decentralized and autonomous computational systems, such as highly distributed networks, has rapidly increased the interest of computer scientists for existence and efficiency of equilib-ria solutions in presence of selfish non-cooperative users. Nevertheless, there are scenarios of practical application (i.e., social networks) in which it can be observed a certain degree of c...
متن کاملOn Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context
Congestion games are, perhaps, the most famous class of non-cooperative games due to their capability to model several interesting competitive scenarios, while maintaining some nice properties. In these games there is a set of players sharing a set of resources, where each resource has an associated latency function which depends on the number of players using it (the so-called congestion). Eac...
متن کاملSocial Context Games
We introduce the study of social context games. A social context game is defined by an underlying game in strategic form, and a social context consisting of an undirected graph of neighborhood among players and aggregation functions. The players and strategies in a social context game are as in the underlying game, while the players’ utilities in a social context game are computed from their pa...
متن کاملSocial Context in Potential Games
The prevaling assumption in game theory is that all players act in a purely selfish manner, but this assumption has been repeatedly questioned by economicsts and social scientists. In this paper, we study a model to incorporate social context, i.e., the well-being of friends and enemies, into the decision making of players. We consider the impact of such other-regarding preferences in potential...
متن کاملSocial optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games
Congestion externalities may result in non-optimal equilibria. For these to occur, it suffices that facilities differ in their fixed utilities or costs. As this paper shows, the only case in which equilibria are always socially optimal, regardless of the fixed components, in that in which the costs increase logarithmically with the size of the set of users. Therefore, achieving a socially optim...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2012.10.041