Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure

Smuggling , Camouflaging , and Market Structure

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, t e market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves wel if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is dir...

Smuggling and the Black Market for Foreign Exchange

This paper develops a model of the black market for foreign exchange in which black market currency is demanded and supplied by tirms engaged in smuggling. It is demonstrated that quotas or foreign exchange rationing are not necessary to induce the coexistence of legal and black foreign exchange markets. Variants of the model analyze the implications of capital flight, unbalanced trade, quotas,...

Market Structure and Price Adjustment in the Iranian Tea Market

Structure, Conduct and Performance of Fish Market in Central Ethiopia

The study aimed at analyzing the structure, conduct and performance of fish market in Lake Zeway, Central part of Ethiopia. A total of 24 traders from 6 markets were selected for the study purposively. Data analysis was carried out using descriptive statistics, for Structure, Conduct and Performance (SCP) approach. According to the results, there were five kinds of fish marketing chains in the ...

Camouflaging Virtual Honeypots

Honeypots are decoys designed to trap attackers. Once deployed, we can use honeypots to log an attacker’s activities, analyze its behavior and design new approaches to defend against it. A virtual honeypot can emulate multiple honeypots on one physical machine, and so provide great flexibility in representing one or more networks of machines. In order to operate effectively, a honeypot needs to...