Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice

Many school districts with centralized choice adopt strategyproof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants of the need strategize on basis beliefs about their own admissions chances. This paper shows that chances shape outcomes even when mechanism is by influencing way search for schools, and “smart matching platforms” provide live feedback help more effectively. Motivated a model in which engage costly schools over-optimism can lead under-search, we use data from large-scale survey participants Chile show learning hard, guide decision stop searching, systematically underestimate non-placement risk. We then RCT RD research designs evaluate scaled policies Chilean New Haven systems. 22% submitting applications where risks are high respond warnings adding lists, reducing risk 58% increasing test score value added at they enroll 0.10 standard deviations. Reducing strategic burden requires not just strategyproofness inside system, but also supports decisions inevitably remain outside it.