Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests
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This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize...
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This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canonical types of competition: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in proportion to performance. We introduce random noise to reflect impe...
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We model competing groups when players’ values for winning are private information, each group’s performance equals the best effort (“best shot”) of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium, the overall expected best shot unambiguously increases with the number of competing teams, though each team’s performance may increase or decrease....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09825-0