Size, leverage, and risk-taking of financial institutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capital Levels and Risk-Taking Propensity in Financial Institutions
Regulators dedicate much attention to a financial institution’s option to default, i.e. the option that distressed financial institutions have to transfer losses to their creditors. It is generally recognized that the existence of this option provides intermediaries with a powerful incentive to keep firm capital close to the minimal requirement. We argue, however, that undercapitalization harms...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.06.018