Sixty seconds on . . . vaccine bribes
نویسندگان
چکیده
Doughnut giant Krispy Kreme is offering “sweet support” to Americans who protect themselves against SARS-CoV-2 by giving a free glazed doughnut anyone provides proof of having had jab. The company’s marketing—I mean, generosity—doesn’t stop there. Glossy, sugar coated, deep fried rings dough are being dropped off at some US vaccination centres for staff delivering the vaccines. Uhmm. Well, you …
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: BMJ
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0959-8138']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n841