Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and by Gale and Sotomayor (1985), and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in Gale and Shapley’s seminal paper (1962)) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that in the case of lying women, for every w...
متن کاملOn Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied in [2] and [3] and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in [1]) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that in the case of lying women, for every woman who is better-off due to lying, there exists a man who is worse-off. In this pap...
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This paper addresses strategies for the stable marriage problem. For the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men proposing, a classical theorem states that it is impossible for every cheating man to get a better partner than the one he gets if everyone is truthful. We study how to circumvent this theorem and incite men to cheat. First we devise coalitions in which a non-empty subset of the liars get be...
متن کاملCoalition Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women or other types of manipulations, such as permutation of complete preference lists. In this paper, we consider manip...
متن کاملCoalition Manipulation of the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women. In this paper, we consider manipulations by any subset of women with arbitrary preferences. We show that a strong ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1077-8926
DOI: 10.37236/3267