Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Single-Parameter Domains and Implementation in Undominated Strategies
This paper studies Algorithmic Mechanism Design where the bidders are “single-parameter”(have the same private value for all desired outcomes), with a focus on Combinatorial Auctions(CA). We study four variants of the CA model: where each player desires a single bundle(“single-minded”) or he desires any one of several bundles (“multi-minded”), and where thedesired bundles are pu...
متن کاملNash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
We study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e. Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. We show that this mild refinement of Nash equilibrium has a dramatic impact on the set of implementable correspondences. Our main result is that if there are at least three agents in the society, then any co...
متن کاملEfficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders
We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in whi...
متن کاملA new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. For the sufficiency results available, although authors succeed in constructing finite implementing mechanisms, they have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” w...
متن کاملImplementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto Correspondence
We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms provided there are at least three agents.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the ACM
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0004-5411,1557-735X
DOI: 10.1145/1462153.1462157