Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Consensus and Single - Peakedness
Consider a set of K alternatives. We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals that rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals that rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner is not necessarily socially acceptable. We propose a concept of consensus as a condition on preference pr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Politics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0951-6298,1460-3667
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400304