Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints∗
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. The equilibria exhibit the exposure problem. The bidder with the highest budget is more reluctant ...
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Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding...
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The possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending induces strategic demand reduction, and generates significant inefficiencies. Under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders’ values, unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained, even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero. JEL classi...
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In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders gene...
متن کاملCollusion via Signaling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities∗
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers’ utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8