Simulating social dilemmas: Promoting cooperative behavior through imagined group discussion.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call translucent players. Typically, play...
متن کاملPromoting Cooperation in Nonlinear Social Dilemmas through Peer Punishment*
Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to th...
متن کاملSocial learning in cooperative dilemmas.
Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection...
متن کاملCooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas
The implausibility of the extreme rationality assumptions of Nash equilibrium has been attested by numerous experimental studies with human players. In particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler’s dilemma, the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high rates of deviation from the unique Nash equilibrium, dependent on the game parameters or the environme...
متن کاملAudience Design through Social Interaction during Group Discussion
This paper contrasts two accounts of audience design during multiparty communication: audience design as a strategic individual-level message adjustment or as a non-strategic interaction-level message adjustment. Using a non-interactive communication task, Experiment 1 showed that people distinguish between messages designed for oneself and messages designed for another person; consistent with ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1939-1315,0022-3514
DOI: 10.1037/a0031233