Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
Introduction. In this paper we examine how cooperation can be supported by negative ties and triadic interactions. Previous research has demonstrated that cooperation is more likely to evolve in social dilemma games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, if the game is played in networks [1, 4, 5, 12]. Besides sparseness [3, 4, 5], the structure of the network is also important because on top of direc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.130.17