Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities
نویسندگان
چکیده
Why do well-functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis groups often embrace viewed as by outsiders a means of ingroup commitment. clarify game-theoretic underpinnings this hypothesis, contrast it similar proposals about functions beliefs, motivate several sociological predictions could be used distinguish from alternative explanations irrational group beliefs.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mind & Language
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0268-1064', '1468-0017']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12392