Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Signals to Partially Informed Investors: Inventory Distortion and Realization of Stock-based Payment
Prior literature has shown that managerial short-termism causes only over-investment at the more efficient type firms for the signaling purpose. Two fundamental assumptions are typically made: the manager’s shortterm incentive is exogenous and the setting of information asymmetry guarantees the manager’s possible payoff functions satisfy the single-crossing condition. In an operations context, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Production and Operations Management
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1059-1478
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12245