Side-Channel Elimination via Partial Control-Flow Linearization

Combating Control Flow Linearization

Piracy is a persistent headache for software companies that try to protect their assets by investing both time and money. Program code obfuscation as a sub-field of software protection is a mechanism widely used toward this direction. However, effectively protecting a program against reverse-engineering and tampering turned out to be a highly non-trivial task that still is subject to ongoing re...

Spatially Varied Flow Profiles in a V-Shaped Side-Channel

Detection via Side - Channel

Title of Dissertation: PRIVATE COMMUNICATION DETECTION VIA SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS Chang-Han Jong Doctor of Philosophy, 2012 Directed By: Professor Virgil D. Gligor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Professor Gang Qu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Private communication detection (PCD) enables an ordinary network user to discover communication patterns (e.g., call...

Plugging Side-Channel Leaks with Timing Information Flow Control

The cloud model’s dependence on massive parallelism and resource sharing exacerbates the security challenge of timing side-channels. Timing Information Flow Control (TIFC) is a novel adaptation of IFC techniques that may offer a way to reason about, and ultimately control, the flow of sensitive information through systems via timing channels. With TIFC, objects such as files, messages, and proc...

Elimination of Side Channel attacks on a Precision Timed Architecture

Side-channel attacks exploit information-leaky implementations of cryptographic algorithms to find the encryption key. These information leaks are caused by the underlying execution platform which contain hardware elements designed to optimize performance at the expense of predictable execution time. This shows that for security systems, not only does the software need to be secure, but the exe...