Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g. the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefficiency, which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors'...
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The recent theoretical literature suggests that consumer myopia may lead firms to profitably suppress or shroud some attributes of the price. Empirical and experimental data also suggest that sellers gain by transferring a larger fraction of the price to the shrouded attributes. However, alternative theories, including mental accounting, could also explain these framing effects. Using field exp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.728545