Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in contest, newcomer can signal his talent an incumbent. In equilibrium, ability occurs only when is exceptionally talented. situations benefits both contestants: obvious reasons; incumbent by economizing on wasted effort contest. Our results rationalize emergence off settings where total important. When selection efficiency matters, decrease welfare. (JEL D82, D83, D91, Z13)
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متن کاملShowing Off, Handicap Signaling, and the Evolution of Men’s Work
Displays are a form of communication, providing information about an individual, often in a widely observable forum. In order for a display to be worth performing, there must be an audience. In order for observers to bother paying attention, it must benefit them to do so. According to costly signaling theory,1,2,4–6 the observer benefit for paying attention is the information about an otherwise...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190234