Shijoshin (Sincere Heart) and Ernst

Sincere voting in large elections

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding to the Condorcet model a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives—as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a “no evidence...

Sincere Apology Without Morai Responsibility

Alice is a moral responsibility abolitionist. She firmly believes that no one (including herselO is ever morally responsible, that rewards and punishments can never be justified on the basis of just deserts, and that blaming people for vicious character traits and vile acts is never morally justified. One day, Barbara, Alice's dearest friend, confides to Alice a special secret: a secret Barbara...

Fully sincere voting

In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategyproofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining....

Sincere Stable Tubes

Sincere Voting in Large Elections

We consider a large two-candidate election with privately informed voters who would all agree on a candidate if their information is aggregated. Due to the presence of uninformed voters who randomly split their votes between the two candidates, there is no equilibrium that is information-efficient under any plurality rule. We introduce an election rule that requires a super majority to elect an...