Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river
نویسندگان
چکیده
Consider a group of agents located along polluted river where every agent must pay certain cost for cleaning up the river. Following model Ni and Wang (2007), we propose class alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes Local (LRS) method Upstream Equal (UES) method. We fi rst show that UES is characterized by relaxing independence upstream costs appearing in (2007). Then provide two axiomatizations with endogenous responsibility method, one using this weak axiom (taken from method) version no blind LRS method). Moreover, also an axiomatization exogenous introducing alpha-responsibility balance. Finally, defi ne pollution cost-sharing game, that, interestingly, Half (HLRS) coincides Shapley value, nucleolus tau-value corresponding game. This HLRS can be seen as some kind middle compromise methods.
منابع مشابه
Sharing a polluted river
A river carries pollutants to people living along it if it is polluted. To make the water in the river clean, some costs are incurred. This poses a question of how to split the costs of cleaning the whole river among the agents located along it. To answer this question, we resort to the two main advocated doctrines in international disputes: the theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) ...
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A number of agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) are connected to a river network. Some agents are located upstream and some downstream. Upstream agents pollute the river network. To clean up the polluted river network, costs are incurred, and they are shared among the agents. In allocating these costs, the upstream-downstream relationship between agents has to be taken ...
متن کاملComment on ‘Sharing a polluted river’
In Ni and Wang (2007) two solutions are given to determine the division of the cost of cleaning a river among the agents located along the river. For each solution the authors give three different motivations, namely (i) an axiomatic characterization, (ii) the solution is the Shapley value of an appropriately defined cooperative TU-game, and (iii) the solution belongs to the Core of the associa...
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n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost.We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3819836