Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
When is it Pareto optimal for risk averse agents to take bets? Under what conditions do they choose to introduce uncertainty into an otherwise certain economic environment? One obvious case is where they do not share beliefs. As in the classical (theoretical) example of horse lotteries, people who do not agree on probability assessments do nd it mutually bene cial to engage in uncertainty-gener...
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The robustness of Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is considered. More precisely, we show by means of an example that two Bayesian agents with almost identical prior beliefs can agree to completely disagree on their posterior beliefs. Secondly, a more detailed agent model is introduced where posterior beliefs are formed on the basis of lexicographic...
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Sharing beliefs about actions
We consider a strategic situation in which each player may not know the probability distribution governing the information structures of his opponents, and consequently his beliefs about opponents' action choices are represented by a set of probability measures. Suppose that beliefs of all the players are common knowledge. Then for any subset of players, the marginal beliefs of those players (a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00127