Sharing and Ascribing Goals

Ascribing Beliefs

Models of agents that employ formal notions of mental states are useful and often easier to construct than models at the symbol (e.g., programming language) or physical (e.g., mechanical) level. In order to enjoy these bene ts, we must supply a coherent picture of mental-level models, that is, a description of the various components of the mental level, their dynamics and their inter-relations....

Ascribing Plans to Agents

Intelligent agents who are situated in nuiltiagent domains must reason about one anotIters' actions and plans. Following the tradition of earlier work in A l , we present a model of plan recognition as belief and intention ascript ion, an inherently defeasible reasoning process. However, we encode this process using a direct argumentation system. Wi th in this system, we can make explicit state...

Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence

This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as...

Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines

Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state. We propose some new definitional tools for this: definitions relative to an approximate theory and second order structural definitions.

Ascribing and Weighting Beliefs in Deceptive Information Exchanges