Shariah Compliant Financial Intermediation in Dual Banking System
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Turkish Journal of Islamic Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2147-9054,2148-3809
DOI: 10.26414/a073