Shared Information Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Differentiation With Shared Features And Cannibalization Of Information Goods
Large sunk cost of development, negligible cost of reproduction and distribution and substantial economies of scale make information goods distinct from industry goods. In this paper, we analyze versioning strategies of horizontally differentiated information goods with shared feature sets, discrete hierarchical groups and continuous individual consumer tastes. Based on our modelling results, w...
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Many strategic planning models have been developed to help decision making in city logistics. Such models do not take into account, or very few, the flow of passengers because the considered unit does not have the same nature (a person is active and a good is passive). However, it seems fundamental to gather the goods and the passengers in one model when their respective transports interact wit...
متن کاملVersioning Information Goods
One prominent feature of information goods is that they have large fixed costs of production, and small variable costs of reproduction. Cost-based pricing makes little sense in this context; value-based pricing is much more appropriate. Different consumers may have radically different values for a particular information good, so techniques for differential pricing become very important. There a...
متن کاملInformation Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition
W study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with ...
متن کاملInnovation Incentives for Information Goods
Innovations can often be targeted to be more valuable for some consumers than others. This is especially true for digital information goods. We show that the traditional price system not only results in significant deadweight loss, but also provides incorrect incentives to the creators of these innovations. In contrast, we propose and analyze a profit-maximizing mechanism for bundles of digital...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.130904