Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges

Package Auctions and Exchanges

We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes. In that case, competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non-empty and comprises the competitive solutions. Also in that case, the Vickrey auction fails to select core allocation...

Aumann-Shapley and Shapley value-based priority pricing: an approach to congestion control in data networks (extended summary)

Common problems in telecommunications networks are usually related to optimal network design and to establishing reasonable cost allocation criteria. Such cost allocation methods do not have to do only with infrastructure costs but also with the effects that a set of users cause on other users' quality of service by using shared network resources. This is precisely the problem of congestion. Al...

Verifiable auctions for ad exchanges

This paper is about a critical component of the Web ecosystem that has so far received little attention in our community: ad exchanges. They run auctions to sell publishers’ inventory—space on a Web page—to advertisers who want to display ads in those spaces. Unfortunately, under the status quo, the parties to the auction cannot check that an auction was carried out correctly, which raises the ...

Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing

Cost allocation problems arise in many contexts in economics and management science. In a typical problem that we have in mind, a decision maker must decide how to allocate the joint cost of production among several commodities using prices. Furthermore, these prices must satisfy certain reasonable postulates among which is the requirement that total revenue associated with these prices must co...

Package Auctions and Package Exchanges