Shady Strategic Behavior: Recognizing Strategic Followership of Dark Triad Followers

Information and strategic behavior

Does encouraging trader participation enhance market competitiveness? This paper shows that, when trader preferences are interdependent, trader market power does not necessarily decrease with greater participation, and traders need not become price takers in large markets. Thus, larger markets can be less liquid and associated with lower ex ante welfare. In the linear-normal model, the necessar...

Strategic Behavior in Matching Markets

Centralized two-sided markets, such as the market for medical residents, often rely on a stable matching mechanism to determine a matching between participants. Because no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is always some room in these markets for strategic misrepresentation. In this paper we study optimal strategic misrepresent...

Strategic Behavior in Judgment Aggregation

Self-confidence and Strategic Behavior

We test experimentally an explanation of over and under confidence as motivated by (perhaps unconscious) strategic concerns, and find compelling evidence supporting this hypothesis in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the highest score wins, one is likely to enter a...

Ricardian Equivalence Survives Strategic Behavior

Robert Barro (1974) showed government debt has no real effects when generations are linked by altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers, a result now known widely as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. An important condition for debt neutrality is believed to be the absence of strategic interactions between members of different generations. I use a simple two-period, parent and child ...