Setting the voting agenda for multi-option referendums: process variations and civic empowerment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Civic Participation and Empowerment through Visualization
This article elaborates on the use of data visualization to promote civic participation and democratic engagement. The power and potential of data visualization is examined through a brief historical overview and four interconnected themes that provide new opportunities for electronic participation research: data storytelling, infographics, data physicalization, and quantified self. The goal is...
متن کامل: Voting the Agenda
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در این پایان نامه یک مولد برای چند قاب یا ابر قاب تولید شده تحت عمل نمایش یکانی تصویر برای گروه های شمارش پذیر گسسته بررسی خواهد شد. مثال هایی از این قاب ها چند قاب های گابور، ابرقاب های گابور و قاب هایی برای زیرفضاهای انتقال پایاست. نشان می دهیم که مولد چند قاب تنک نرمال شده (ابرقاب) یکتا وجود دارد به طوری که مینیمم فاصله را از ان دارد. همچنین مسایل مشابه برای قاب های دوگان مطرح شده و برخی ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Democratization
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1351-0347,1743-890X
DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1823969