منابع مشابه
1 The Vickrey Auction and Algorithmic Mechanism
These are lecture notes for one third of the class CS364B, Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory, offered at Stanford University in the Fall 2005 term. They cover the topic of combinatorial auctions, with an undeniably strong bias toward recent work by the “STOC/FOCS” (algorithms and complexity) community. I assume that the reader has a solid background in undergraduate algorithms and complexity; o...
متن کامل2 The Vickrey - Clarke - Groves ( VCG ) Mechanism
3 Examples of VCG mechanisms 5 3.1 Single-item auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Auctions of identical items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 Procurement auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4 Public project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
متن کاملKnightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced ...
متن کاملAnalyzing the Privacy of a Vickrey Auction Mechanism
This article studies the properties of a distributed mechanism to perform the Vickrey auction. This mechanism, which was originally presented in López, Núñez, Rodríguez, and Rubio (2004), has the main characteristic that most of the information concerning the bids is kept private for both bidders and the auctioneer without the necessity of any trusted third party. In particular, after the aucti...
متن کاملExploring Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3667371