Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find the best school for their children; doctors run costly tests to establish the best kidney for a given patient. In t...
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For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). These two mechanisms both have desirable economic and computational properties, but the outcomes they induce can be incomparable in many instances, thus creating challenges i...
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A computer system uses several serial files. The files reside on a direct-access storage device in which storage space is limited. Records are added to the files either by jobs in batch processing mode, or by on-line transactions. Each transaction (or job) generates a demand vector which designates the space required in each file for record addition. Whenever one file runs out of space, the sys...
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Fix a Pareto optimal, strategy proof and non-bossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanism is identical to the lottery that arises under random serial dictatorship, where the order of di...
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In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. RSD has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assign...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te1335