منابع مشابه
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
In auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it, revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results. When the time between auctions goes to zero, seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price. With many bidders, the seller equi...
متن کاملSequentially Optimal Mechanisms
We characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism in a two-period model. A risk neutral seller owns one unit of a durable good and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information. The seller has all the bargaining power; she designs an institution to sell the object at t=0 but she cannot commit not to change the institution at t=1 if trade does not occur at t=0. The seller’s ob...
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This document establishes that the result in "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" is robust to a number of extensions. 1. Robustness: Longer Horizon & Alternative Degrees of Transparency We will show that our result is robust in a number of di¤erent directions. The rst extension considers the possibility that the game lasts arbitrarily long, but nitely many periods. The next three extensions are...
متن کاملStructural Patterns of Tractable Sequentially-Optimal Planning
We study the complexity of sequentially-optimal classical planning, and discover new problem classes for whose such optimization is tractable. The results are based on exploiting numerous structural characteristics of planning problems, and a constructive proof technique that connects between certain tools from planning and tractable constraint optimization. In particular, we believe that struc...
متن کاملTechnical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
This document contains a number of omitted proofs and a more "formal" proof of the main theorem of the paper "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms." 1. Omitted and Detailed Proofs for the Case that T = 2 Proof of Proposition 2 Step 1 We start by proving existence of the solution of the sellers problem when T = 1. The seller seeks to solve
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1467-937X,0034-6527
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00409.x