منابع مشابه
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
In auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it, revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results. When the time between auctions goes to zero, seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price. With many bidders, the seller equi...
متن کاملSequentially Optimal Mechanisms
We characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism in a two-period model. A risk neutral seller owns one unit of a durable good and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information. The seller has all the bargaining power; she designs an institution to sell the object at t=0 but she cannot commit not to change the institution at t=1 if trade does not occur at t=0. The seller’s ob...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions
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متن کاملExtensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
This document establishes that the result in "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" is robust to a number of extensions. 1. Robustness: Longer Horizon & Alternative Degrees of Transparency We will show that our result is robust in a number of di¤erent directions. The rst extension considers the possibility that the game lasts arbitrarily long, but nitely many periods. The next three extensions are...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions with Information Acquisition Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition *
This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition. First, we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation. We then show that under certain conditions, standard auction...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0529