Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential voting with abstention
Dekel and Piccione (2000) have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.297.2