Sequential Search Auctions With a Deadline

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Selecting a Selling Institution: Auctions versus Sequential Search

Under conditions of asymmetric information, the seller's choice of a selling institution entails sorting of buyers by valuation type in order to price discriminate and maximize profits. We consider the seller's choice between sequential search and an auction in the presence of discounting and transaction costs when selling n homogeneous units of a good. Our analysis shows that the expected retu...

متن کامل

Sequential Auctions with Synergy and A liation

This paper studies sequential auctions with synergy in which each bidder's values can be a liated across auctions, and empirically assesses the revenue e ects of bundling. Ignoring a liation can lead to falsely detecting synergy where none exists. Motivated by data on synergistic pairs of oil and gas lease auctions, where the same winner often wins both tracts, I model a sequence in which a rst...

متن کامل

Position Auctions with Consumer Search

This paper examines a model in which position auctions influence consumer search. Both the selection of firms to include and the ordering of firms affect the efficiency of consumer search. Implications for reserve prices, click-through weights, and product variety are discussed. A two-stage auction mechanism is proposed. JEL Classification No.: D44, L86, M37

متن کامل

Heuristic Search under a Deadline By

HEURISTIC SEARCH UNDER A DEADLINE by Austin Dionne University of New Hampshire, May, 2011 In many heuristic search problems of practical interest, insufficient time is available to find a provably optimal solution. The currently accepted methods of finding a best possible sub-optimal solution within a time deadline are the anytime methods which do not directly consider the time remaining in the...

متن کامل

Sequential Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Participation

Milgrom and Weber's (1982) seminal paper was a major step towards building an economic theory of auctions, on the foundations laid by the pioneering work of Vickrey (1961). In this process of building such theory economists have concentrated on the sale of a single object. One of the major concerns of theorists has been to examine the conditions under which di erent auction forms generate the s...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2018

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3133797