منابع مشابه
Coordinated Sequential Bayesian Persuasion∗
This paper studies an extended Bayesian Persuasion model in which multiple senders persuade one Receiver sequentially and the subsequent players can always observe previous signaling rules and their realizations. In the spirit of Harris (1985), I develop the recursive concavification method to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, which summarizes the multiplicity of possible strategic ...
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This paper studies a Bayesian Persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one Receiver. Players can always observe signaling rules of prior players and their realizations. I develop a recursive concavification method to characterize the set of SPEa. I prove the existence of a special type of equilibrium, called the Silent Equilibrium, where at most one sender designs a nont...
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In many settings of economic interest, information is ex ante symmetric, but one agent designs the informational environment—i.e., controls what additional information will be generated. A number of recent papers study such situations, with applications including Internet advertising (Rayo and Segal 2010), communication in organizations (Jehiel 2013), bank regulation (Gick and Pausch 2012; Gold...
متن کاملBayesian Persuasion
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a ...
متن کاملBayesian Persuasion
2590 Suppose one person, call him Sender, wishes to persuade another, call her Receiver, to change her action. If Receiver is a rational Bayesian, can Sender persuade her to take an action he would prefer over the action she was originally going to take? If Receiver understands that Sender chose what information to convey with the intent of manipulating her action for his own benefit, can Sende...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te3474